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Abstract: In this paper, we quantified the effect of liberalization of entry restriction 
for large-scale retailers (LSR) on small and medium enterprises (SME) for the Japanese 
retailing sector in the late 1990s. We constructed a new regional database and compared 
SME performance at the regional level between regions with/without LSR entry. To 
tackle the endogeneity between LSR entry and SME performance, we used the 
propensity score matching method. Comparison with matched samples suggests that 
LSR entry does not have any negative effect on SME performance. On the contrary, we 
found a positive effect on SME sales and employment especially in suburban districts. 
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1.  Introduction 
Liberalization policy and its effect on economic performance have long attracted 
the attention of researchers. Entry regulation has especially been considered as one of 
the key factors of the slow rate of job creation or productivity growth. For example, 
according to the multiple reports by the McKinsey Global Institute (1994, 1997, 2000) 
in continental European countries and Japan, anti-competitive policies such as entry 
regulation are the main cause of the US–Europe and US–Japan differences in job 
creation and productivity improvement in the service sector. 
Recently, a substantial body of empirical literature has grown up examining the 
impact of liberalization policy. Indeed, there have been a series of studies
2 since the 
1990s, which have been based on cross-country analysis. However, most of them have 
faced many difficulties, such as omitted variables, endogeneity, reverse causality, and so 
forth. Most recent studies rely on microdata that enable us to use various techniques to 
reduce endogenous bias. 
The purpose of this study is to quantify the effect of relaxation of entry restriction 
on corporate performance in the retail industry in Japan (Japanese retail industry). 
Especially, we focus on the performance of small and medium enterprises (SME) in 
terms of sales, employment and productivity. In general, entry regulations are designed 
to favor incumbent small enterprises. Japan experienced liberalization of entry barriers 
for large-scale retailers (LSR) in the late 1990s. Our newly created regional database 
provides us new insights on how LSR entry has affected small retailer performance. 
Indeed, there is a contrasting view on the effect of LSR entry on incumbent stores’ 
employment. Some researchers point out the effect of LSR entry on job creation 
exceeds that on job destruction while others do not. We extend our focus to region-level 
SME sales, employment quality, entry, and exit by comparing regions with/without LSR 
entry. 
The organization of the rest of this paper is as follows. The second section 
surveys related literature. The third section explains the historical overview of the entry 
regulation for LSR including a data overview, while the fourth section studies our newly 
developed regional database. In the fifth section, we brief our estimation strategies to 
access the effect of SME performance. Estimation results are presented in the sixth 
section. A summary and conclusion are presented in the final section. 
 
2.  Related Literature 
This paper is built on three concepts. First, it is obviously connected to the 
                                                 
2  For example, see Baily (1993).   3
research work on the effect of regulation on corporate performance. This issue has 
attracted the attention of economists for a long time. To avoid reverse causality, recent 
studies have tended to rely on microdata. For example, Olley and Pakes (1996) explored 
the productivity dynamics in telecommunication equipment industries with gradual 
liberalization of the regulatory environment. Also, Pavcnick (2002) analyzed the effect 
of relaxation of import restriction on plant-level productivity in Chile. In case of the 
retailing sector, Bertrand and Kramarz (2002) and Schivardi and Viviano (2006) 
investigated the effect of restriction for LSR entry on incumbent employment, for 
France and Italy, respectively, suggesting that LSR entry has a positive effect on local 
employment. Nishida (2008) examined the effect of zone ordinance on chain store entry 
in Okinawa prefecture in Japan. 
This paper also refers to the extensive literature on the effect of Wal-Mart’s entry 
to the US retail market; especially, the effect of Wal-Mart’s entry on incumbent small 
outlets has gathered the attention of researchers, as well as that of policy makers. For 
example, Basker (2005) and Neumark et al. (2008) attempted to quantify the effect of 
Wal-Mart’s entry on local employment at the country level. Both use the instrumental 
variable method to control endogeneity between the decision on Wal-Mart’s entry and 
changes in employment. However, the results are contrastive. While Basker (2005) 
presented the evidence of a positive net job creation effect, Neumark et al. (2008) found 
a negative effect.
3  
Thirdly, there are several researches concerning the effect of entry restriction for 
LSR in Japan. For example, Flath (1990) investigates the determinants of retail density 
at the prefecture level. Using the number of department stores as a proxy for the 
regulation, he concludes that Japan’s high retail density can be explained mainly by 
economic or geographical factors and that entry restriction is not a dominant factor. On 
the other hand, Nishimura and Tachibana (1996) introduce the original regulation index 
and analyzed the relationship between labor productivity at the prefecture level and 
entry restriction in Japan. Using the prefecture-level regulation index estimated with 
survey data, they found the regulation has significant negative effect on labor 
productivity in the retail sector in Japan. After the year of liberalization, researchers 
have started to investigate the effect of the deregulation by comparing restriction for 
LSR entry before and after liberalization. With advancement in data availability, most of 
them tried to investigate it with a microeconometric technique. For example, Igami 
(2007) and Abe and Kawaguchi (2008) investigated the effect of LSR entry on 
                                                 
3  Summary and more detailed survey on Wal-Mart issues can be found in Basker 
(2007).   4
incumbent small supermarkets. Igami (2007) uses the outlet-level panel data set and 
examines changes in incumbent supermarket sales. To tackle the endogeneity, he uses 
the propensity score matching method. He claimed that there is no negative effect of 
LSR entry on incumbent supermarkets. Abe and Kawaguchi (2007) analyzed the effect 
on incumbent prices by using scanner data. They found a significant negative effect of 
LSR entry on incumbent stores prices.   
These previous studies focus only on the aggregated indicators or the effects on 
incumbent supermarkets. However, policy makers, as well as researchers, have been 
paying much attention to the effect on small, family-owned businesses and the skill 
structure of regional employment. In this regard, our newly developed 
establishment-level data enable us to shed light on additional outcome indicators, such 
as SME sales, wage payment, entry, exit and productivity, as well as employment. 
 
3.  Entry regulation for retail trade in Japan 
In Japan, the establishment of LSR has been highly restricted by law to protect 
the businesses of smaller-sized retailers. The protection for small retail businesses 
originated from the “Department Store Law” of 1937, which was suspended in 1947 and 
reinstated in 1956. The law forced those who planned to open a new department store to 
get an approval of the national government. In 1974, the law was enforced as the 
“Large-Scale Retail Store (LSRS) law” targeting the stores with floor space of 500 m
2 or 
over, which included not only department stores but also large superstores. At the same 
time the new law had another purpose—to restrain new entrants with large capital from 
abroad.  
In 1978, the law was reinforced. When an LSR started a new business in a certain 
area, it had to notify the Ministry of International Trade and Industry first. The minister 
investigated the effect of the entry on smaller retailers in that area. If a significant 
negative effect was expected after the investigation, the minister urged the entrant to 
modify their business plan regarding their service characteristics such as floor space, 
business days, closing times, and the number of holidays. The role of the minister was 
just to illustrate guidelines. Locally constituted panels of consumers, businessmen, and 
academics carried out substantial adjustments. Furthermore, local governments were 
allowed to impose additional regulations on the entry of large stores, their floor space, 
and operating hours.   
In the 1990s, the trend changed from protectionism to deregulation as a result of 
“The Japan–US Structural Impediments Initiative,” which was aimed at creating a 
Japanese open market and promoting competition. In 1994, the LSRS law was eased to   5
give more freedom to new entrants to the retail industry with less than 1000 m
2 of floor 
space. Finally, in 2000, the law was completely repealed. 
Figure 1 presents annual average entry and exit rates of retail outlets from 1979 to 
2004. After 1994, the exit ratio has constantly exceeded the entry ratio and it increased 
in absolute value up to 9.9% in 2004. The entry rate began to increase since 1997 and 
amounted to 7.9% in 2004 probably reflecting the liberalization of entry restrictions. 
 
= Figure 1 = 
 
At the same time, sales share by size of outlets changed between 1997 and 2004 
(Figure 2). Sales share for stores with floor space less than 500 m
2 decreased from 64% 
to 58%. Conversely, sales share for stores with floor space 500 m
2 or over, whose 
establishment was highly restricted under LSRS law, increased substantially. For 
example, stores with floor space 1500 m
2 or over and under 3000 m
2 increased from 5% 
to 70%. Stores with floor space of 3000 m
2 or over also increased their share from 22% 
to 23%.   
 
= Figure 2 =   
 
Figure 3 presents changes in number of outlets by type and features of location 
between 1997 and 2004. On the whole, the number of large stores that have floor space 
more than 1000 m
2 increased and their growth rate amounts to 3% on average. On the 
other hand, the growth rate of the number of small stores was –2% on average. Looking 
at the growth rate by type of location, in traditional cluster districts, such as the city 
center or station-side area, most of which are located in densely inhabited districts, both 
large stores and small stores decreased in number. Turning to the other districts, which 
are sometimes categorized as suburban area, there was marked growth, especially in 
large stores. For office districts and industrial districts, the growth rates of large stores 
exceeded more than 10%. This trend reflects the fact that densely inhabited districts had 
grown “thinner and broader” as a result of decreases of population in city centers and 
increases of population in suburban areas (METI 2006). This phenomenon is known as 
“hollowing out” of city center and some policy makers believe it has been accelerated 
by the increase of relocation of large stores from city center to suburban area. Recently, 
to revitalize city centers, some regional governments have introduced new regulations 
which restrict the new establishment of LSR with a floor space 10,000 m
2 or over in 
suburban area. Our empirical assessment will provide some evidence on the causal   6
effect of LSR entry. 
In this study, reflecting the sharp contrast of outlet dynamics among areas and 
districts, we classify (a) Near-station-type commercial district, (b) 
City-area-background-type commercial district, (c) Residential-background-type 




= Figure 3 = 
 
4.  Estimation Strategy 
This paper examines causal effects of entry and exit of LSR on SME performance 
(e.g., sales, employment, and productivity) at the regional level. Let ENTRYit∈{0, 1} be 
an indicator of LRS entry in area i in period t. The average effect of treatment on the 
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it are the outcomes of SME in area i at period t with and without LSR 
entry. As is well known, we cannot observe the last term; i.e., the SME performance in 
the area with LSR entry would not be obtained if there had been no entry. The estimates 
after replacing the last term with the observable E (y
0
it | ENTRYit = 0) are consistent with 
the ATT only if the value inside the curly brackets in the following is equal to zero: 
 
ATT = E (y
1
it | ENTRYit = 1) − E (y
0
it | ENTRYit = 0)   
+ {E (y
0
it | ENTRYit = 0) − E (y
0
it | ENTRYit = 1)}. 
 
If not, the estimates suffer from so-called sample selection bias.     
To avoid the sample selection bias, this paper adopts matching techniques; 
particularly, the propensity score matching method of Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983). 
Instrument variable method is an alternative technique, but it is always difficult to find 
convincing instruments. On the other hand, under some assumptions, the matching 
method enables us to estimate counterfactuals that cannot be directly observed. 
Furthermore, the matching method is a kind of non-parametric analysis and has the 
advantage that there is no need to specify the functional form of outcomes and 
                                                 
4  For a detailed definition of classification of location category, see Appendix Note 
3-4-1, in METI (2006).   7
disturbances (Friedlander et al., 1997).  Economic applications of matching methods 
have grown in recent years and they have been used for the evaluation of these: policy 
intervention in the labor market （Heckman et al., 1997; Blundell et al., 2002）, the 
effects of export or FDI on corporate performance (De Loecker, 2007; Navaretti and 
Castellani, 2004), and the effects of environmental regulation on plant birth ratio at the 
county level (List et al., 2003) etc. 
The methodology proposed by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) is to find a vector of 
observable variables X which affect both the performance indicator y and the treatment 
variable ENTRY such that 
 
{ } X y y | ENTRY ,
0 1 ⊥ ,  1 ) | 1 ( 0 < = < X ENTRY P , 
 
where⊥represents mathematical independence, and P(∙|X) denotes the predicted 
probability conditional on X, i.e., propensity score, of LSR entry. In other words, X is 
assumed to capture all the inherent differences in performance between the treated and 
control groups, i.e., regions with LSR entry and those without, respectively. This 
assumption is called conditional independence assumption (CIA). By using such a 
vector X, if regions have one LSR entry, the difference in performance of those areas 
purely represents the impact of LSR entry.   
First, we estimate the propensity score of LSR entry at period t for area i as 
follows: 
 
P (ENTRYit = 1) = F (Xit-1),  
 
where Xit-1 is a vector of explanatory variables, such as population growth rate, number 
of LSR per population, and so forth. Let Pit be the predicted probability of LSR entry at 
period t for area i in the treatment group. Second, at each point in time and for each area 
i, a counterfactual area is selected as follows: 
 
|Pit – Pjt| = min {Pit − Pkt} 
k  ∈   {l | ENTRYlt = 0} 
We used one-to-one nearest neighbor matching technique. We imposed some 
assumptions required to assure consistency of the ATT estimates: y
0
it  ⊥ ENTRY it | Xit-1 
and P (ENTRYit = 1| Xit-1) < 1. As suggested by Heckman et al. (1997), we assessed the 
impact of LSR entry by examining the change in the ex-post performance variables of 
the treatment and the control group from year t to year t+1. This indicator is called the   8
difference-in-difference (DID) estimator which is defined as the following indicator: 
 
[ ] ∑ ∈ + + − − − =
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An alternative strategy is to compare directly the ex-post performance variables. 
However, the DID estimator has advantages because it is independent from 
region-specific, unobservable, time-invariant factors which are not accounted for by X.   
To ensure the validity of the estimation of propensity score and the matching 
based on the estimated propensity score, we statistically tested the condition of the 
balancing property as follows: 
 
| ( 1 |) ENTRY X P ENTRY X ⊥ = , 
which means that, for a given propensity score, treatment observations are randomly 
chosen, and as a result, regions with LSR entry and regions without LSR entry are 
identical  on average. To check whether the balancing property is satisfied, we 
implement the test of balancing property proposed by Becker and Ichino (2002). 
 
5.  Data 
In this paper, we developed a new regional database by aggregating the individual 
data of the Wholesale and Retail Census (WR Census) performed by the Research and 
Statistics Department within the Minister’s Secretariat, Ministry of Economy, Trade and 
Industry (METI). This census covers all establishments active in the wholesale and 
retail sector. Since it was first performed in 1952, the survey has been conducted every 
3 or 5 years. The latest data set is for 2004 and we used the data for 1997 and 2004. This 
covers the periods before and after the abolition of LSRS law. The WR Census contains 
establishment data on employment, sales, floor space, establishment age, and operating 
hours. We aggregated the data of individual stores at the regional level by sector and 
store size. Our sector classification consisted of the following: apparel retailing, food 
and beverage retailing, furniture retailing, appliances retailing, and generalized 
merchandise Stores (GMS). 
The regional category comes from Minryoku statistical urban area, which is 
almost parallel to a metropolitan area in the US.
5 Furthermore, as we discussed in 
                                                 
5  Minryoku urban area is basically defined according to commutation area. It consists 
of two regional categories. One is “economic area,” which is defined by dividing all 
Japan into 109 areas. The other is “urban area,” which consists of more than 1000 
smaller areas. The concept of “urban area” is closer to commutation area. For details,   9
Figure 3, we divide each Minryoku statistical urban area into two groups; one is the 
“city district” and the other is the “suburban district” according to the location category 
in the WR census. Consequently, our observation units consisted of around 3,500 
regional units. For our analysis, considering the difference in market characteristics, we 
classify our regional units in Tokyo, Nagoya, and Osaka metropolitan areas
6 as 
“metropolitan area” and others as “provincial area.” 
Our outcome variables are growth rate of sales, employment, wage payment, and 
productivity and entry and exit rate at the regional level. In our sample periods,  the 
retail industry experienced a substantial increase in part-time worker ratio. Between 
1997 and 2004, According to the Monthly Labor Survey (Ministry of Health and Labor), 
the part-time worker ratio for wholesale and retail industry has increased from 26.8% to 
44.1%. And given the fact that there is substantial wage gap between full-time worker 
and part-time worker
7, the differences of growth rate of employment and wage payment 
can be attributed to changes in the composition of type of employment. As for 
productivity index, since there is no information on capital stock at individual 
outlet-level, we calculated labor productivity index
8. 
Table 1 presents the average number of LSR in each area by regional category 
and sector. We have three cut-offs for LSR according to floor space 1,000 m
2 or over, 
3,000 m
2 or over, and 5,000 m
2 or over, and they are shown in panels (a), (b), and (c), 
respectively. Two things are noteworthy about LSR with floor space 1,000 m
2 or over. 
First, in suburban districts, the average number of LSR has been substantially increasing 
both in metropolitan areas and provincial areas. For example, in panel (a), while the 
average number of apparel retailing LSR in provincial areas/suburban districts has 
increased from 0.426 to 0.821. In contrast, the average number of LSR for provincial 
areas/city districts has slightly decreased from 0.655 to 0.563. This trend is the same as 
in Figure 3. Second, in most of the regional categories and industries, the number of 
LSR has either increased or remained constant; however, only the number of GMS in 
city districts has been decreasing both in metropolitan areas and provincial areas. For 
                                                                                                                                               
see Asahi-Shimbunsha (2006). 
6  Tokyo, Nagoya, and Osaka metropolitan areas are defined by Minryoku regional 
database (Asahi-Shimbunsha; 2006). It includes Tokyo, Nagoya, and Osaka and 
neighboring cities, such as Yokohama, Chiba, Saitama, Sakai, and Nara. 
7  According to the Census of Wage Structure (Ministry of Health and Labor), while 
average hourly wage for full-time worker in Tokyo as of 2004 is 2774 yen, that for 
part-time worker is 1033 yen. 
8  Adjustment of hours worked for labor input and data cleaning are explained in 
Appendix A.   10
example, in suburban districts, the average number of GMS in city district has increased 
from 1.020 to 1.256 and 1.145 to 1.278 for metropolitan and provincial areas, 
respectively. On the other hand, in city districts, the average number of GMS in 
suburban district has decreased from 3.282 to 2.977 and 2.085 to 1.610 for metropolitan 
and provincial areas, respectively. This fact might reflect recent stagnation of sales and 
profit for large department stores and supermarket chains in city districts. 
 
== Table 1 == 
 
For our analysis, since we were interested in the effect of LSR entry on SME 
performance at the regional level, we restricted our sample to those areas where there 
was no LSR in 1997. Moreover, we define LSR as those stores with floor space 1,000 
m
2 or over, whose entry was restricted under LSRS law as of 1997. SME is defined as 
those stores whose floor space is less than 1,000 m
2 and operating under 14 hours.
9 In 
addition, we excluded small stores that belong to the same building of LSR as tenants 
from our sample.
10 
Table 2 shows the sample size of our regional data and the ratio of areas 
with/without LSR entry to the total number of areas. As presented in Table 2, the ratio 
of areas with LSR entry in suburban districts is higher than that in city districts. 
Especially, in provincial areas/city district, the ratio of areas with LSR entry is quite 
small. For example, for food retailing stores, while the ratio of areas with LSR entry in 
provincial areas/suburban district is 63%, that in provincial areas/city district is 21%. 
 
== Table 2 == 
 
Tables 3 compares SME performance between regions with/without LSR entry. 
On the whole, SME performance in regions with LSR entry is better than those in 
regions without LSR entry. Especially, when LSR is defined as those stores with a floor 
space of 5,000 m
2 or over, sharp contrasts have emerged. For example, scrutinizing the 
total effect in Table 3, panel (d), in provincial areas/suburban districts, the growth rate 
                                                 
9  In this period, small food retailing stores operating 24 hours for 7 days (convenience 
stores) have substantially increased market shares. To distinguish this innovative retail 
format from the traditional small retail outlet, SME are restricted to stores with less than 
14 operating hours. For details of characteristics of convenience stores in Japan, see 
Larke (1994) and Mayer-Ohle (2003). 
10  In WR census, we can identify those small stores that belong to the building of LSR 
with floor space 1,000 m
2 or over.   11
of sales and employment for regions with LSR entry is 3.7% and 2.4% respectively, 
while that for regions without LSR entry is 2.1% and 1.5%. However, this result might 
reflect the fact that regions with LSR entry are attractive for enterprises in other 
industries and might have higher population growth rate and, as a result, have a positive 
effect both on LSR and SME. Thus, we should take care of these endogenous biases by 
the propensity score matching method. As for the growth rate of employment and wage 
payment, the former exceeds the latter in all regional categories. Especially, in 
provincial area/suburban districts, while the number of employment is increasing in area 
with LSR entry, the growth rate of wage payment is negative. It may suggest that 
increased competition accompanied with LSR entry has forced small retailers to replace 
full-time worker with part-time worker to save cost. 
 
== Table 3 == 
 
6.  Empirical Results 
We started by running a probit regression to derive the probability of LSR entry 
with the regional data. As we mentioned in the explanation of Table 2, our analytical 
sample is restricted to those areas where there were no LSR in 1997. We define an entry 
dummy as 1 if LSR has entered the area between 1997 and 2004, and 0 otherwise. The 
propensity of LSR entry is considered to be a function of the number of LSR per 
population (large_pop), its square (large_pop
2), the number of LSR in surrounding 
regions (largen3_pop), population growth rate (population growth), log of population 
(log_population), income inequality index (income), and the ratio of daytime population 
to nighttime population (day-by-night).
11 Detailed definitions and summary statistics 
are presented in Table 4 and Table 5, respectively. All independent variables except 
population growth are values in 1997. 
 
== Table 4 == 
== Table 5 == 
 
The estimation result for the probit model is presented in Table 6. We found the 
number of LSR per population, its squares, and the size of population have significant 
                                                 
11  In addition to variables explained above, we tried to include car ownership ratio, the 
ratio of people aged 65 or over to total population and income inequality index by area. 
However, their coefficients are not significant, and when including these variables the 
test of balancing property is not satisfied. Therefore, we dropped these variables.   12
coefficients. Using this result of probit estimation, we retrieved the propensity score to 
match areas with LSR entry (treated group) to those without LSR entry that are similar 
in terms of their observable characteristics (control group). Areas are matched 
separately for each regional category and industry using one-to-one matching with 
replacement. The common support assumption is also imposed as suggested in literature. 
As we discussed in section 4, in order to verify whether the balancing properties are 
satisfied or not, as suggested by Becker and Ichino (2002), we perform the following 
algorithm: (i) splitting the sample such that average propensity scores of the treated and 
control groups do not differ, and (ii) within each interval, testing whether the means of 
every element of covariate X are different between treated and control groups (balancing 
hypothesis). If there are no statistically significant differences between the two, then we 
moved forward to compare the treatment group and control group.   
 
== Table 6 == 
 
     Our outcome variables included the balancing hypothesis of SME annual growth 
rate of sales, number of employees, wage payment and productivity, and entry and exit 
rate for SME at the regional level. In addition, to highlight the effect on incumbent 
continuing stores (Existing SME), we calculated growth rate of sales and employment 
for those SME which were observed both in 1997 and 2004 in our panel data set. Table 
7 (a) presents the comparison between areas with LSR entry (treated) and matched areas 
without LSR entry (control) by region. There are two noteworthy findings. First, entry 
rates are significantly different between treated and control except for provincial 
areas/city districts, suggesting that LSR entry promoted new entry. Second, for growth 
rate of sales and employment, we did not find any significant effect. For those stores 
that continued functioning, there is no significant effect. 
One may be interested in the impact of LSR entry by the floor size. As we present 
Table 3, the differences of SME performance become more significant as the size of 
LSR becomes larger. Therefore, in panel (b) and (c) in Table 7, we restrict our treatment 
group to areas with LSR whose floor space are 3,000 m
2 or over and 5,000 m
2 or over, 
respectively. As for the result of LSR with floor space 3,000m
2 or over, significant 
positive effect on almost all performance indicator has emerged in provincial area/city 
districts. However, in other regional categories, any significant effect cannot be found 
except for a few exception. The effects of LSR entry become clearer when we restrict 
treatment group to those stores with floor space 5,000 m
2 or over. In provincial area, we 
found additional significant positive effect on productivity in city districts. And in   13
suburban area, there is positive effect on existing SME's productivity.   
 
== Table 7 == 
 
What is the key driver of SME's productivity growth? Following from Foster et al. 
(2008), we decompose the total labor productivity growth rate into the 5 factors; (1) a 
within effect, (2) a between effect, (3) a covariance term, (4) an entry effect and (5) an 
exit effect
12. While a within effect is weighted average of individual outlet-level 
productivity growth, a between effect and the entry and exit effects are the contribution 
by changes in share of continuing, entering and exiting outlets, respectively. The 
decomposition of productivity growth in provincial area/city and suburban districts for 
panel (c) of Table 7 are presented in Table8. In both districts, within effect and entry 
effect for treatment group are higher than those of control groups. It implies that in 
provincial area, LSR entry may have some spillover effects on existing and entering 
SMEs.  
== Table 8 == 
 
However, on the whole, the effect of LSR entry is quite limited. There is almost 
no significant effect on sales and employment in metropolitan areas/suburban districts. 
The growth rate or sales and employment for existing SME do not have significant 
difference between treatment group and control group except for provincial areas/city 
districts. 
 
7.  Conclusion 
In this paper, we quantified the effect of liberalization of entry restriction for large 
stores on SME performance for the Japanese retailing sector in the late 1990s. While 
previous studies restrict their focus of study to the effect on SME employment, our 
newly created regional database enables us to control detailed regional characteristics 
and shed light on various performance indicators, such as sales, wage payment and 
productivity. To tackle the endogeneity between LSR entry and SME performance, we 
used the propensity score matching method. Comparison with matched sample 
suggested that LSR entry did not have any negative effect on SME performance. Instead, 
we found a positive effect on the SME's sales and employment in some cases, which 
coincide with the findings in European studies such as those by Bertrand and Kramarz 
                                                 
12  For detailed definition of productivity decomposition by Foster et al. (2008), see 
Appendix B.   14
(2002), and Schivarrdi and Viviano (2007). The positive effects of LSR entry are found 
in provincial area/suburban district when we focus on the effect of entry of LSR with 
floor space 5000m
2 or over. And we found LSR entry has positive effect not only on 
employment but also sales, wage payment and productivity. 
In Japan, in order to prevent “hollowing out” of city center district, a variety of 
measures to revitalize those districts are currently being studied, and some regional 
governments have introduced a new restriction for an establishment of new large stores 
with floor spaces 10,000 m
2 or over in suburban districts. However, our results imply 
such a policy may not bring about any gain for SME in city center and hinder job 
creation in suburban districts. 
In terms of future work, we would like to corroborate our results by dividing our 
sample in various dimensions. Since the impact of LSR entry might differ according to 
region, by dividing our regional category in further detail, we expect to gain further 
evidence and policy implications concerning the effects of LSR entry.   15
Appendix A: Procedure to estimate outlet-level productivity 
index 
A1. The Definition of productivity growth 
This appendix explains how we construct productivity index at outlet-level. Since 
there is no information on capital stock in WR census, the productivity index we used is 
the labor productivity index, which is defined as follows; 
it it it L Q P ln ln − = ,     (2.1) 
where Q is real gross output and L is labor input. We used gross margin as output. Since 
margin ratio in WR census is available only at the firm level, not at the establishment 
level, we estimated gross margin following from the estimation method by U.S Bureau 
of Economic Analysis (hereafter BEA). In BEA approach, the constant value of gross 








base is the nominal value of margin ratio, in detailed sectral level in base year 
and Q is deflated sales value. We calculated base year margin ratio with 2002 Wholesale 
Retail Census in 4-digit sector level. As for the deflator for retailing sales, we calculated 
retailing price index by year, prefecture, and commodity with using “Consumer Price 
Index” (Ministry of Internal Affaires and Communications) and “Retail Price Survey” 
(Ministry of Internal Affaires and Communications).   
 
A2. Adjustment hours worked 
As for labor input, since some retailers make extensive use of part-time labor, it is 
essential to incorporate the differentials in composition of labor input among outlets. 
Besides, it is well known that there is a significant hourly wage gap between full-time 
workers and part-time workers. Therefore, it would be better to take into account not 
only differentials in hours worked but also those in wage rate. However, data constraints 
make it difficult to construct FTE labor inputs. While the data for 2004 contained the 
proportion of part-time workers, data for 1997 provided only the total number of   16
workers. Average hours worked and hourly wage were not available at the establishment 
level.  
We estimated the hours worked and hourly wage using the following 
methodology: for hours worked by part-time workers, since the 2002 data provides both 
actual numbers of part-time workers and FTE number of part-time workers, we assumed 
that average hours worked by part-time workers by retail format categories were 
constant between 1997 and 2004, and constructed hours worked ratio by retail format 
categories. As average hourly wage for both full-time workers and part-time workers are 
available from the Census of Wage Structure (Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare) 
every year by prefecture, we calculated the hourly wage ratio by prefecture. For the 
number of part-time workers in 1997, we adjusted the 1997 data by linking with the 
Establishment and Enterprise Census (Ministry of Internal Affairs and 
Communications), which provides proportions of part-time workers at the establishment 
level. Our labor input indicator is defined as follows: 
  Labor input = # of full-time workers   
  + # of part-time workers × hours worked ratio × wage ratio 
 
A3. Productivity and Establishment Age 
In our analysis, we deleted those establishments whose age is less than 2 years. 
This is because their productivity level cannot be estimated correctly and as a result, 
there is serious bias in the relationship between productivity and age of establishment as 
depicted figure A1. The reason for surprisingly low productivity of young establishment 
is that there is inconsistency between young outlets and old outlets in terms of unit of 
survey period. For young outlets, although the length of operation might be less than 12 
months, all outlets are requested to report “annual sales.” On the other hand, input value 
is measured by employment at the point of survey. Therefore, output value for young 
outlets might be underestimation. If more detailed information of market entry, e.g. date 
or month of entry as well as year of entry, is available, output value for young outlets 
can be adjusted. However, since there is only year of entry in the questionnaire of WR 
census, we dropped young outlets from our sample. 
 
= Figure A1 =   17
Appendix B: The decomposition of productivity growth 
Productivity decomposition is a method for linking aggregate productivity growth to 
micro productivity growth. Aggregate productivity growth is the weighted average of 
establishment-level productivity growth, where the weights are related to the 
importance of the establishment in the industry: 
∑ = it it t P s P       ( B 1 )  
where  t P   is the index of industry productivity,  it s   the employment share of 
establishment i in industry
13, and  it P   an index of establishment-level productivity. 
Foster et al. (2001) review the computations used in empirical studies that decompose 
aggregate productivity growth into components related to within-establishment 
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   (B2) 
where C denotes continuing establishments, N denotes entering establishments, and X 
denotes exiting establishments. In the decomposition, aggregate productivity growth 
between the two periods is composed of five components. The five components 
distinguished are (1) a within-establishment effect – within-establishment growth 
weighted by initial output shares; (2) a between-establishment effect – changing output 
shares weighted by the deviation of initial establishment-level productivity and initial 
industry-level productivity; (3) a covariance term – the sum of establishment-level 
productivity growth multiplied by establishment share change; (4) an entry effect –a 
year-end share-weighted sum of the difference between the productivity of entering 
establishments and initial industry productivity; and (5) an exit effect – an initial 
share-weighted sum of the difference between initial productivity of exiting 
establishments and initial industry productivity. The between-establishment and the 
entry and exit terms involve a deviation of establishment-level productivity from initial 
                                                 
13  For example, Foster et al (2008) argues since sales figure sometimes highly 
fluctuates, they used labor input as share weight.   18
industry-level productivity. A continuously operating establishment with increasing 
shares makes a positive contribution to aggregate productivity only if it initially has the 
industry average. Entering (exiting) establishments contribute positively only if they 
have lower (higher) productivity than the initial average. We apply the decomposition in 
equation (B2) by industry and region. Based on previous studies, we use the labor input 
for share weights
14. We use the nominal output weights to average across sales formats.   
  An average productivity growth and its decomposition are presented in Table B1. 
Besides, this table compares the pattern of US productivity dynamics estimated by 
Foster et al (2008). Although sample period is substantially different, the magnitude and 
the pattern of productivity growth are quite similar between US and Japan. For example, 
both US and Japan have achieved around 1.1%-1.4% productivity growth annually from 
1987 to 1997 for US and from 1997 to 2004 for Japan. Besides, the contribution of 
reallocation is quite high for both US and Japan. It accounts for 74% (1.06%/1.43%) 
and 84% (0.96%/1.14%) of total productivity growth rate for US and Japan, respectively. 
One thing we should note is that while entry share effects exceeds exit share effect in 
US; the latter is large than the former in Japan. This point might reflect Japans’ negative 
growth for number of outlets. 
 
== Table B1 == 
 
Table B2 presents productivity dynamics and contribution of LSR by industry. Three 
finds stand out form this table. First, looking at a contribution of large-scale outlet, one 
for entry share effect is significantly high. For sector total, it explains 60% (6.3%/9.8%) 
of overall entry share effect. In case of Generalized Merchandise Store (GMS), 
Furniture and Appliances, in contrast to negative or zero contribution by SMEs, that of 
LSR entry is quite high. Second, except for GMS, the contributions of small outlet for 
exit share effect are substantially large. Since the contribution of large-scale outlet for 
exit share effect is sometime negative, that of small outlet accounts for most of exit 
share effect. Third, the contributions of SMEs for between share effects are consistently 
positive and account for most of between share effects except for GMS. These facts 
suggest there is sorting effect of LSR entry on SMEs’ performance. LSR entry might 
promote competition among retailers and it induces unproductive small stores to drive 
out from markets. It might be reflected by the positive exit share effect of SMEs. At the 
same time, positive between share effects by SMEs implies that newly opened LSR 
                                                 
14  For example, Foster et al (2008) argues since sales figure sometimes highly 
fluctuates, they used labor input as share weight.   19
attracts consumers in broader retail trading area, and it might bring a spillover effect on 
SMEs with higher productivity level.     
 
== Table B2 ==   20
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Table 1 Average number of LSR by regional categories and sectors 
 
(a) Average number of LSR (floor space  1,000 m
2 over)
1997 2004 1997 2004 1997 2004 1997 2004
APPAREL 0.934 0.925 0.498 0.829 0.655 0.563 0.426 0.821
FOOD 2.751 3.012 2.710 4.327 1.476 1.522 2.807 4.546
FURNITURE 0.883 0.842 1.706 1.878 0.847 0.762 2.084 2.359
APPLIANCE 0.404 0.700 0.527 1.473 0.212 0.249 0.497 1.224
GMS 3.282 2.977 1.020 1.256 2.085 1.610 1.145 1.278
(b) Average number of LSR (floor space  3,000 m
2 over)
1997 2004 1997 2004 1997 2004 1997 2004
APPAREL 0.328 0.253 0.024 0.049 0.170 0.100 0.043 0.033
FOOD 0.224 0.303 0.188 0.388 0.119 0.146 0.170 0.374
FURNITURE 0.154 0.158 0.318 0.629 0.132 0.144 0.314 0.563
APPLIANCE 0.079 0.196 0.082 0.522 0.031 0.071 0.066 0.337
GMS 2.895 2.721 0.814 1.107 1.849 1.452 0.902 1.119
(c) Average number of LSR (floor space  5,000 m
2 over)
1997 2004 1997 2004 1997 2004 1997 2004
APPAREL 0.220 0.183 0.016 0.033 0.102 0.062 0.021 0.021
FOOD 0.062 0.116 0.041 0.118 0.021 0.025 0.023 0.113
FURNITURE 0.042 0.079 0.102 0.237 0.031 0.052 0.060 0.218
APPLIANCE 0.013 0.083 0.020 0.155 0.010 0.021 0.018 0.078
GMS 2.484 2.352 0.591 0.884 1.470 1.239 0.612 0.860
Metropolitan area Provincial area
city district suburban district
Metropolitan area Provincial area
city district suburban district city district suburban district
Provincial area
city district suburban district city district suburban district
Metropolitan area
city district suburban district
 
Source: Authors’ calculation.   24









145 167 300 358 970
% of LSR entered areas 9% 18% 10% 28% 18%
% of no LSR areas 91% 82% 90% 72% 82%
56 56 206 131 449
% of LSR entered areas 20% 54% 21% 63% 37%
% of no LSR areas 80% 46% 79% 37% 63%
132 79 260 145 616
% of LSR entered areas 15% 16% 7% 22% 13%
% of no LSR areas 85% 84% 93% 78% 87%
188 166 408 340 1102
% of LSR entered areas 19% 45% 7% 31% 22%
% of no LSR areas 81% 55% 93% 69% 78%
11 83 68 163 325
% of LSR entered areas 9% 27% 12% 25% 22%
% of no LSR areas 91% 73% 88% 75% 78%
Note: 
1) LSR is defined as those store with floor space 1,000m
2 or over.
2)"LSR entered areas" are the areas where there was no LSR in 1997, but there were some LSR in 2004.







# of ares where there was
no LSR in 1997.
Total
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Table 3 Simple comparison of average SME's performance by area with or without LSR 
entry at regional-level 
Simple comparison of average SME's performance by area with or without LSR entry at regional-level








Sales change -1.7% -2.2% -3.8% -2.1%
Employment change -0.5% 0.1% 0.0% 3.2%
Wage payment -2.2% -1.2% -1.4% 1.5%
Entry rate 16.9% 20.1% 23.9% 27.1%
Exit rate 29.5% 26.7% 24.3% 21.5%
Productivity change -4.2% -3.0% -5.1% -5.1%








Sales change 22.9% 0.8% -1.2% 0.2%
Employment change 9.0% 2.5% 1.5% 4.2%
Wage payment 5.7% -0.1% -0.6% 0.9%
Entry rate 24.7% 25.6% 25.4% 28.0%
Exit rate 28.7% 27.2% 26.3% 25.0%
Productivity change -1.7% -2.6% -2.5% -0.9%








Sales change -4.2% -5.1% -3.1% -1.8%
Employment change -2.5% -2.9% -2.9% -2.6%
Wage payment -3.5% -4.0% -4.3% -4.2%
Entry rate 12.3% 13.8% 10.7% 7.1%
Exit rate 30.7% 29.3% 28.2% 25.6%
Productivity change -3.7% -3.6% -0.9% 0.8%








Sales change 2.1% 3.7% 20.6% 35.6%
Employment change 1.5% 2.4% 10.0% 15.3%
Wage payment -0.3% -0.3% 4.0% 6.6%
Entry rate 20.0% 21.8% 23.5% 24.5%
Exit rate 26.5% 26.1% 22.9% 20.5%
Productivity change -2.8% -1.8% -0.6% 1.5% 
Note: All performance indicators are annual average growth rate of outcome variables 
between 1997 and 2004.   26
Table 4 Definition of Variables in probit model 
Variable name Explanation/Definition Date Source
large_entry1,000 [LSR with more than 1,000m
2 floor entered area] dummy 1997, 2004 Authors calculation
large_pop # of LSR per 1,000 persons 1997, 2004 Minryoku
large_pop
2 squares of # of LSR per 1,000 persons 1997, 2004 Minryoku
largen3_pop # of LSR per 1,000 persons within neaby regions except own region 1997, 2004 Minryoku
population growth population growth rate from the previous year (%) in the same region 1996-1997, 2003-2004 Minryoku
log(population density) logged population density 1997, 2004 Minryoku
log(population) logged population 1997, 2004 Minryoku
income income inequality (national average=100) 1997, 2004 Minryoku
daybynight ratio of daytime population to night time population 1996 Minryoku  
   27
 
 
Table 5 Summary Statistics 
variables N mean sd p25 p75
large_entry1000 3462 0.213 0.410 0.000 0.000
large_pop 3462 0.009 0.021 0.000 0.011
large_pop2 3462 0.001 0.004 0.000 0.000
largen3_pop 3462 0.013 0.014 0.004 0.017
population growth rate 3462 -0.005 0.049 -0.037 0.026
ln(population density) 3462 6.186 1.605 5.044 7.257
log(population) 3462 11.493 0.858 10.885 11.989
income 3462 0.923 0.222 0.769 1.044




Table 6 Estimation results for the probit model 
Dependent Variable
Coef. s.e. z-ratio p-value
large_pop 9.749 2.037 4.79 0.00
large_pop2 -13.167 10.690 -1.23 0.22
largen3_pop 0.228 2.187 0.1 0.92
population growth rate 1.012 0.722 1.4 0.16
ln(population density) 0.034 0.027 1.25 0.21
log(population) 0.108 0.035 3.08 0.00
income -0.263 0.217 -1.21 0.23
day-by-night 0.047 0.029 1.61 0.106






Dummy variable for LSR (floor>=1,000)
entered area  28
Table 7 Comparison with matched sample by region and district 
(a) The effects of LSR (with more than 1,000 m
2 floor space) entry on SME
Treated Control t    Treated Control t    Treated Control t    Treated Control t   
sales change -0.022 -0.037 1.03 0.006 0.010 -0.26 -0.052 -0.046 -1.12 0.022 -0.004 0.94
employment change 0.000 -0.009 0.77 0.024 0.018 0.62 -0.029 -0.030 0.30 0.018 0.004 1.47
wage payment -0.013 -0.023 0.85 -0.001 0.000 -0.16 -0.040 -0.043 0.68 -0.005 -0.010 0.76
entry rate 0.200 0.155 2.42 ** 0.256 0.236 1.31 0.137 0.105 3.10 *** 0.219 0.198 2.25 **
exit rate 0.266 0.286 -1.13 0.273 0.279 -0.49 0.293 0.311 -1.17 0.257 0.274 -1.61
productivity change -0.030 -0.052 2.11 ** -0.028 -0.021 -0.84 -0.037 -0.029 -1.21 -0.022 -0.027 1.10
sales change -0.044 -0.038 -0.90 -0.036 -0.033 -0.55 -0.043 -0.039 -1.26 -0.029 -0.038 1.71 *
employment change -0.013 -0.006 -1.89 * -0.004 -0.004 -0.15 -0.012 -0.009 -1.13 -0.005 -0.005 -0.13
wage payment -0.019 -0.017 -0.77 -0.017 -0.012 -1.47 -0.021 -0.021 -0.03 -0.016 -0.013 -1.40
productivity change  -0.608 -0.289 -0.96 -0.512 -0.331 -0.84 -0.796 -0.324 -1.36 -0.332 -0.389 0.72
(b) The effects of LSR (with more than 3,000 m
2 floor space) entry on SME
Treated Control t    Treated Control t    Treated Control t    Treated Control t   
sales change -0.038 -0.037 -0.04 -0.016 0.010 -1.29 -0.031 -0.046 1.13 0.140 -0.004 2.56 **
employment change 0.000 -0.009 0.60 0.012 0.018 -0.58 -0.029 -0.030 0.19 0.071 0.004 3.64 ***
wage payment -0.014 -0.023 0.61 -0.006 0.000 -0.69 -0.043 -0.043 -0.10 0.030 -0.010 3.39 ***
entry rate 0.239 0.155 3.07 *** 0.250 0.236 0.62 0.107 0.105 0.12 0.232 0.198 1.97 **
exit rate 0.243 0.286 -1.50 0.263 0.279 -0.74 0.282 0.311 -0.91 0.219 0.274 -2.69 ***
productivity change -0.051 -0.052 0.05 -0.027 -0.021 -0.55 -0.009 -0.029 1.71 * -0.016 -0.027 1.26
sales change -0.045 -0.038 -0.66 -0.030 -0.033 0.56 -0.033 -0.039 0.98 -0.008 -0.038 2.93 ***
employment change -0.009 -0.006 -0.52 -0.003 -0.004 0.03 -0.016 -0.009 -1.56 -0.003 -0.005 0.49
wage payment -0.021 -0.017 -0.79 -0.015 -0.012 -0.58 -0.028 -0.021 -1.48 -0.014 -0.013 -0.12
productivity change  -0.486 -0.289 -0.32 -0.442 -0.331 -0.47 -0.233 -0.324 0.67 -0.256 -0.389 0.94
(c) The effects of LSR (with more than 5,000 m
2 floor space) entry on SME
Treated Control t    Treated Control t    Treated Control t    Treated Control t   
sales change -0.021 -0.037 0.52 -0.004 0.010 -0.52 -0.018 -0.046 1.61 0.248 -0.004 3.48 ***
employment change 0.032 -0.009 1.52 0.037 0.018 1.20 -0.026 -0.030 0.44 0.106 0.004 4.38 ***
wage payment 0.015 -0.023 1.55 0.009 0.000 0.72 -0.042 -0.043 0.04 0.047 -0.010 3.94 ***
entry rate 0.271 0.155 2.76 *** 0.272 0.236 1.18 0.071 0.105 -1.33 0.238 0.198 1.87 *
exit rate 0.215 0.286 -1.57 0.250 0.279 -0.99 0.256 0.311 -1.26 0.190 0.274 -3.21 ***
productivity change -0.051 -0.052 0.03 -0.014 -0.021 0.47 0.008 -0.029 2.38 ** 0.001 -0.027 2.70 ***
sales change -0.051 -0.038 -0.73 -0.025 -0.033 0.90 -0.025 -0.039 1.64 0.017 -0.038 4.06 ***
employment change -0.005 -0.006 0.07 -0.001 -0.004 0.43 -0.015 -0.009 -0.98 0.000 -0.005 1.06
wage payment -0.012 -0.017 0.52 -0.015 -0.012 -0.38 -0.027 -0.021 -0.99 -0.012 -0.013 0.37
productivity change  -1.147 -0.289 -0.84 -0.514 -0.331 -0.55 -0.217 -0.324 0.58 -0.026 -0.389 2.10 **
Note:
"***","**","*"denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.
Existing
SME
Major Urban Area - suburban district Provincial area - suburban district Provincial area - city district Major Urban Area - city district
all SME
Provincial area - suburban district Provincial area - city district Major Urban Area - city district
Major Urban Area - suburban district Provincial area - suburban district Provincial area - city district
Existing
SME
Major Urban Area - suburban district
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Table 8 The decomposition of productivity growth in provincial area with LSR (floor space 
5,000m
2 or over) entry 
Treated Control Treated Control
Productivity growth 0.8% -2.9% 0.1% -2.7%
within effect 0.9% -2.0% -0.8% -2.7%
between effect 0.6% 0.8% 0.3% 0.6%
cross term -1.7% -1.9% 0.0% -1.3%
entry effect 0.2% -0.6% 1.0% -0.2%
exit effect 0.7% 0.9% -0.4% 0.9%
City district Suburban district  30
Table B1 International comparison on labor productivity growth between US and Japan 
Period
entry share exit share
Japan 1997-2004 1.43% 0.39% 1.06% 0.87% -1.89% 2.07% 0.64% 1.43%
USA 1987-1997 1.14% 0.18% 0.96% 0.27% -0.45% 1.13% 0.62% 0.51%
Source: For Japan, authors' calculation. Unit: annual average growth rate.









  Net entry
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Table B2 Decomposition of labor productivity growth for 1997-2004 and contribution 
of Lager outlets 
Large outlet 0.93% 0.33% 0.13% -0.30% 0.89% -0.19%
small outlet -0.10% -0.41% 0.74% -1.57% 0.40% 0.81%
Large outlet 0.04% 0.07% -0.07% -0.11% 0.43% -0.23%
small outlet -1.10% -1.69% 0.59% -1.33% 0.36% 0.91%
Large outlet 0.74% 0.19% 0.10% -0.23% 0.70% -0.14%
small outlet 0.81% 0.27% 0.96% -2.09% 0.90% 0.89%
Large outlet 0.27% 0.11% -0.13% -0.29% 1.23% -0.61%
small outlet -2.36% -1.76% 0.46% -1.09% -1.37% 1.33%
Large outlet 2.47% 0.09% -0.16% -0.07% 2.60% -0.43%
small outlet -3.03% -1.84% 0.61% -0.69% -1.11% 0.44%
Large outlet 2.84% 2.07% 1.07% -1.34% 1.13% 0.11%
small outlet 0.37% 0.01% 0.09% -0.03% 0.00% 0.10%
Small outlets are those outlets whose floor space is less than 1000m
2.










0.83% -0.07% 0.87% -1.87%
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Source: Census of Commerce
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1500 to under 3000 ㎡
3000 ㎡ and over
 
Source: Census of Commerce   33
Figure 3 Changes in number of outlets by type and features of location between 
































































    Source: Census of Commerce  34
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